$\beta$-Variational Classifiers Under Attack by Maggipinto, Marco et al.
β-Variational Classifiers Under Attack
Marco Maggipinto ∗ Matteo Terzi ∗ Gian Antonio Susto ∗∗
∗Department of Information Engineering (DEI), University of Padova,
Italy (e-mail: marco.maggipinto@phd.unipd.it, terzimat@dei.unipd.it))
∗∗DEI and Human-Inspired Technology Center, University of Padova,
Italy (e-mail: gianantonio.susto@dei.unipd.it)
Abstract: Deep Neural networks have gained lots of attention in recent years thanks to the
breakthroughs obtained in the field of Computer Vision. However, despite their popularity, it
has been shown that they provide limited robustness in their predictions. In particular, it is
possible to synthesise small adversarial perturbations that imperceptibly modify a correctly
classified input data, making the network confidently misclassify it. This has led to a plethora
of different methods to try to improve robustness or detect the presence of these perturbations.
In this paper, we perform an analysis of β-Variational Classifiers, a particular class of methods
that not only solve a specific classification task, but also provide a generative component that
is able to generate new samples from the input distribution. More in details, we study their
robustness and detection capabilities, together with some novel insights on the generative part
of the model.
Keywords: Adversarial Training, Computer Vision, Deep Learning, Machine Learning,
Robustness
1. INTRODUCTION
The astounding performance that Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) provide when dealing with large amounts of com-
plex data has recently led to extensive research in Deep
Learning (DL) technologies. Empirical evidence shows
that, in contrast to standard Machine Learning (ML)
methods, DNNs are able to generalize well in the over-
parametrized regime (Belkin et al. (2018a,b)), i.e. when
the number of parameters of the model is much higher than
the number of data used to train it; hence, there is basically
no limit, other than the computational capabilities, to the
complexity of the hypothesis class of functions that is of
practical use. Despite this property, that is still not well
understood and object of an entire line of research, the
high complexity of the input-output relationship comes at
a cost: the predictions provided by DNNs are not inter-
pretable, making it difficult to understand what caused the
model to take a particular decision; moreover, (Szegedy
et al. (2013)) discovered that DNNs are susceptible to
adversarial perturbations, small changes in the input space
that result in high changes in the output space. This
allows the creation of Adversarial Examples (Goodfellow
et al. (2014)): for example, in image classification, it is
possible to synthesise artificial images that, while visually
identical for the human eye to a correctly classified sample,
they are confidently misclassified. While such problem is
common in ML, it is emphasized in DNNs by the high
dimensionality of the input space and the complexity of
the function described by the DNN that may be subject
to high curvature directions that can be exploited, even
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in a small neighborhood of a point, to significantly change
the response of the network.
The discovery started a completely new research trend
that tries to understand the phenomenon (see Liu et al.
(2016); Shaham et al. (2018)) or find ways to defend
against it. The most common approach to train robust
networks is Adversarial Training (Goodfellow et al. (2014);
Madry et al. (2017); Terzi et al. (2020)) that consists
in generating adversarial examples and feeding them to
the network during training along with the correct label.
While effective, such method comes at the cost of reduced
prediction accuracy (Tsipras et al. (2018)) and increased
training time compared to standard models. Other ap-
proaches have been proposed to obtain robust models such
as gradient regularization (Ross and Doshi-Velez (2018)),
Lipschitz regularization (Finlay et al. (2018)) and cur-
vature regularization (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2019)). A
different research line focuses on developing methods to
detect adversarial examples, without requiring the model
to be robust. In (Feinman et al. (2017)) it is proposed to
combine Kernel Density Estimation on the hidden layer
of the network (Botev et al. (2010)) and MC-Dropout
(Gal and Ghahramani (2016)) that provides an estimate
of the prediction uncertainty of the network. The rationale
behind the method is that adversarial examples should
have lower likelihood according to the estimated density
and higher prediction uncertainty. (Gong et al. (2017))
propose to train a binary classifier as a detection method:
it is shown that such approach is able to detect 99% of
adversarial examples and it is robust to a second attack
that aims at fooling the detection method. (Grosse et al.
(2017)) uses the kernel-based two-sample test (Gretton
et al. (2012)) to detect statistical differences between ad-
versarial examples and normal data.
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Fig. 1. Bayesian network of a VAE (left) and the Varia-
tional Classifier analyzed in this work (right).
Recently, (Li et al. (2018)) proposed a study on the
robustness of Generative Classifiers and their detection
capabilities. They propose three detection methods whose
rejection policies are respectively: 1) reject samples with
likelihood of the input lower than a certain threshold; 2)
Reject samples with joint input/output likelihood lower
than a certain threshold; 3) Reject over/under confident
predictions. The methods have proven effective on object
recognition tasks. Moreover, they show that models with
lower capacity are more robust to adversarial examples.
We build upon (Li et al. (2018)) to provide an analysis of β-
Variational Classifiers, a similar approach but based on β-
Variational Autoencoders (Higgins et al. (2017)) that are
able to provide a disentangled representation of the input
(Burgess et al. (2018)) and give an alternative method to
control the model capacity. In particular, the contributions
of our paper are as follows:
• We analyze the robustness of β-Variational Classifiers
combined with sparse regularization;
• We analyze the detection capabilities of β-Variational
Classifiers;
• We analyse the effects of adversarial perturbations on
the decoder network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
section 2 and 3 we provide a description of β-Variational
Autoencoders and their β-Variational Classifiers. In Sec-
tion 4 we explain the phenomenon of adversarial examples
and the main method used to synthesise them. In Section
5 and 6 we describe the experimental settings and outline
the obtained results. Finally, in Section 7 conclusions and
future works are reported.
2. β-VARIATIONAL-AUTOENCODERS
Generative modeling aims at learning a parametrized
model of the probability distribution underlying the data
in order to obtain new realistic samples from it. In this
context, Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) (Kingma and
Welling (2013)) are a well know approach to develop a
complex latent variable model that can be learned by
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SDG).
Given a dataset of independent identically distributed
samples {xi} i = 1, · · · , N with distribution p(x), we
introduce hidden variables {zi} i = 1, · · · , N of dimension
d distributed as a multivariate Gaussian p(z) ∼ N (0, I)
with I ∈ Rd×d the identity matrix.
VAEs model the joint distribution of the random variables
X and Z as pθ(x, z) = pθ(x|z)p(z) corresponding to
the bayesian network in Figure 1(left) where the mean
of pθ(x|z) is the output of a Decoder Neural Network
Dθ(z) parametrized by parameters θ, typical choices are
Gaussian pθ(x|z) ∼ N (Dθ(z), I) for continuous output
or Bernoulli pθ(x|z) ∼ B(Dθ(z)) for binary output. Be-
ing the zi unknown, we aim at finding the parameters
value that maximizes the marginal likelihood; however,
this requires evaluating an intractable integral to compute
pθ(x) = Ez [pθ(x|z)], which is also difficult to approximate
by means of Monte Carlo methods due to the dimension-
ality of the hidden factors and the amount of data that
is often very high in Deep Learning settings. In a similar
scenario approximate inference is typically very effective;
more in details, introducing an approximate posterior dis-
tribution qφ(z|x) ∼ N (µ(x,Σ(x)) where µ(x),Σ(x) are
output of an Encoder network. We define the Expectation
Lower bound (ELBO) L(θ,φ,x) as:
L(θ,φ,x) =−DKL (qφ(z|x) || p(z)) +
Eqφ(z|x) [log pθ(x|z)] (1)
Where DKL is the KullbackLeibler divergence. It is always
true that (for a detailed proof see Bishop (2006)):
log (pθ(x)) ≥ L(θ,φ,x) (2)
(2) has important implications when the parametrized
distributions are extremely complex, such as Neural Net-
works. We can in fact maximize the ELBO instead of the
intractable marginal likelihood. In particular, if we analyze
the expression in (1), the Decoder network is trained
to minimize an expected reconstruction error, while the
Encoder network distribution is pushed to be close to the
prior, this acts as a regularizer, tuning the capacity of the
Encoder. Such regularizer impacts the type of represen-
tations that the Encoder can learn, in particular (Belkin
et al. (2018a)) showed that by controlling this term using
the following modified ELBO:
L(θ,φ,x) =β|DKL (qφ(z|x || p(z))− C|+
Eqφ(z|x) [log pθ(x|z)] (3)
The model is able to produce disentangled representations
that are related to different characteristics of the image,
e.g. color, shape etc. Here β and C are hyperparameters,
the first one is usually kept very high around 1000 while
the second directly control the capacity and is linearly
increased at training time from 0 to a predefined value
(this procedure has been shown to provide better repre-
sentations). This modified version, is called β-VAE.
During optimization, Eqφ(z|x) [log pθ(x|z)] is computed
using a Monte Carlo approximation Eqφ(z|x) [log pθ(x|z)]
≈ 1M
∑M
m=1 log pθ(x|z(m)) {zm}Mm=1 ∼ qφ(z|x). Since it is
not possible to back-propagate through the sampling op-
eration, a reparametrization trick is used i.e. zm = µ(x) +
ξmΣ(x) with ξm ∼ N (0, 1). The detailed optimization
procedure is reported in Algorithm 1.
3. β-VARIATIONAL-CLASSIFIERS
β-VAEs provide an interesting method to perform varia-
tional inference in the presence of complex parametrized
models of probability distributions with hidden factors. A
Algorithm 1 Training Procedure
Input: {x(i)}ni=1, B,M, β,C, niter
1: for j = 1 . . . niter do
2: Sample B examples from the training set {x(i)}Bi=1
3: Sample B ·M latent variables z(i)m
4: c = linearSchedule(C, j)
5: Compute the gradient with respect to Φ,θ
δθ = ∇θ 1
B ·M
B∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
log pθ(x
(i)|z(i)m )
δΦ =∇Φ 1
B
B∑
i=1
[
β |DKL
(
qφ(z|x(i)) || p(z)
)
− c|+
+
1
M
M∑
m=1
log pθ(x
(i)|z(i)m )
]
6: Ascend the gradient θ = ascendRule (θ, δθ)
7: Ascend the gradient Φ = ascendRule (θ, δΦ)
8: end for
similar optimization procedure can be employed to learn
a more complex Bayesian model that includes a random
variable Y representing a class which the input belongs
to. The resulting model is called β-Variational Classifier
(β-VAC) . In this work, we focus our study on a particular
β-VAC represented by the Bayesian network in Figure 1
(right), we assume that the dataset is composed by couples
{x(i), y(i)}ni=1 where y(i) are the true labels (i.e. object
classes) associated to the input. Introducing the condi-
tional distribution pω(y|z). The ELBO for such model is:
L(θ,φ,x, y) =−DKL (qφ(z|x, y) || p(z)) +
+ Eqφ(z|x,y) [log pθ(x|z)pw(y|z)]
(4)
From now on, we assume that qφ(z|x, y) = qφ(z|x) which
states that all the information about z is contained in x.
The resulting ELBO, including the modified regularizer of
Section 2 can be expressed as follows:
L(θ,φ,x, y) =β|DKL (qφ(z|x) || p(z))− C|+
+ Eqφ(z|x) [log pθ(x|z)pw(y|z)]
(5)
The optimization procedure to learn the model parameters
is analogous to Algorithm 1.
4. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In object recognition, an adversarial example is an image
that, while being visually indistinguishable or very similar
to a correctly classified input, is confidently mis-classified
by the model. The most common approach to synthetize
an adversarial example xadv is the Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) attack, where a normal data x is perturbed
by following an ascending direction of the loss function
while remaining in an -ball B(x) = {xadv s.t. ||x −
xadv||p ≤ } centered at the original sample. More in
details, let L(x, y) be the value of the loss at x where y
is the correct label,  > 0 the maximum distance from the
original input relative to the maximum input value (e.g.
255 for 8bit images), k the number of iterations and α the
step size, PGD works as desctibed in Algorithm 2.
Proj(xj , B(x)) is the projection operator that varies
depending on the chosen norm, typical choices are `2
Algorithm 2 PGD
Input: x, y, k, , α
1: x0 = x
2: for j = 1 . . . k do
3: xj = xj + α∇L(xj , y)
4: xj = Proj(xj , B(x))
5: end for
6: xadv = xj
7: return xadv
Fig. 2. Adversarial example on a digit recognition task:
the 6 on the left is correctly classified while the one
on the right is classified a 4.
and `∞. The value of  identifies the strength of the
applied perturbation. Typically, for simple tasks such as
handwritten digit recognition, an high value is necessary
to fool the network while for more complex tasks, the
value can be much smaller. Figure 2 shows an adversarial
example on a digit recognition task dataset, with  = 0.1.
5. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
In order to analyze the robustness of β-VAC to adversarial
examples we train the model on two popular datasets
in Computer Vision for handwritten digit classification 1
(MNIST) and for clothes recognition 2 (Fashion-MNIST or
FMNIST by Zalando research). They both are composed
by 60 thousand labeled images for the train set and 10
thousand for testing, the images are in grayscale of size
28× 28.
The structure of the model is as follows:
• Encoder: is an adapted Allcnn (Springenberg et al.
(2014)) to provide an hidden representation of size
100 i.e. z ∈ R100;
• Decoder: has a structure symmetric to the encoder,
in order to provide as output an image of the same
dimension of the input;
• Classifier: is a 2 layer perceptron with 64 hidden
neurons per layer and ReLu (Nair and Hinton (2010))
activations.
We train for 60 epochs using an SGD optimizer with
momentum 0.9 and learning rate 0.01 that is decreased
at the 10th and 30th epoch by a factor of 10. The strength
of the momentum is a common choice in literature while
the other attributes have been chosen in order to properly
1 http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist
2 https://github.com/zalandoresearch/fashion-mnist
train the network. We employ a small weight decay of
1e-6 (typical values are around 1e-3 for the Allcnn) so
its influence on the capacity is limited and we are free
to control it using the KL regularization term in the
ELBO. We use PGD to compute the adversarial examples
with variable strength, in particular for MNIST we use
 ∈ [0, 0.3] while for FMNIST  ∈ [0, 0.1]; the choice is
justified by the more difficult classification task of the
second dataset so a smaller perturbation is sufficient to
effectively attack the network. We keep the number of
iterations equal to 40 and the step size 0.01, the value
of  is referred to the `∞ norm.
6. RESULTS
In this section we outline the obtained results and, in
particular, we analyze the effect of the capacity and sparse
regularization on the robustness and detection capabili-
ties of the β-VAC described in the previous section. To
conclude, we visually inspect the reconstructed images of
adversarial examples, showing some interesting properties.
6.1 Adversarial detection
The decoder part of the model can be extremely useful to
detect adversarial examples: by definition, they provide an
high variation of the network output given small variations
of the input; hence, if the reconstructed image is strongly
affected by the adversarial perturbation, it will probably
be very different to the input fed to the network. An
example of this phenomenon is shown in Figure 3(a)
and 4(a), it is noticeable how the the reconstruction
error considerably increases at the strengthening of the
attack. We can thus train a classifier on the reconstruction
error to obtain an effective attack detection methods.
In the following, we will use a logistic classifier trained
on adversarial examples computed on the training set
and we analyse its performance by computing adversarial
examples on the test set, and classifying both clean input
and perturbed ones. We use the classification rate as
performance metric being the dataset well balanced due
to the high effectiveness of adversarial attacks.
6.2 Capacity effect
In Figure 3(b) and 4(b) we report the robustness of
the β-VAC, measured in terms of accuracy at classifying
adversarial examples, as a function of the parameter C
controlling the capacity of the encoder network. We don’t
notice particular correlation between the capacity and
the accuracy. On the FMNIST dataset, for small attack
strength, there are some values of C that provide better
robustness i.e. 0.01 and 1.0, however the first one has low
accuracy on clean samples ( = 0) due to the limited
capacity of the model. In general, we cannot conclude to
be able to control the robustness by changing the capacity.
For the detection rate Figure 3(c) and 4(c), the capacity
seems to have a more strong effect, in particular when
values are too low, such as 0.01, the reconstruction error
is high also for normal samples, making it difficult to
distinguish them from the adversarial ones. On the other
hand, we don’t see a positive correlation between capacity
and detection rate, so the parameter has to be fine tuned
to get the best result. Overall, the detection accuracy is
very good on the MNIST dataset also due to the higher
attack strength used, for FMNIST the detection rate is
well above 70% with the right capacity for every attack
strength.
6.3 Sparse regularization effect
The idea of adding sparse regularization is motivated by
the fact that the encoder network of β-VAE has been
shown to provide disentangled representations. Hence, if
the classifier selects only the ones that are useful for the
classification task and discard the others, it should be more
robust to adversarial perturbations. In Table 1 and 2 we
show the effect of the `1 regularization on the robustness
of the classifier trained using the best performing capacity,
i.e 1.0 for MNIST and 10.0 for FMNIST. The `1 regu-
larization does not seem to provide improved robustness.
This result provides us the following insight: while it is
easy to see that for linear models, obtaining l∞-robustness
is equivalent to applying `1-regularization, for non-linear
model this relation is not true. Thus, our results give the
evidence that the Encoder network is not providing robust
latent embeddings.
Overall, the detection accuracy is lower than the one
for the non regularized method. This would be a fair
price to pay in case of improved robustness but from the
results obtained it is probably better to avoid using `1
regularization and choose the correct model complexity
with C.
6.4 Decoded images inspection
We analyse here the effect of an adversarial perturbation
on the decoded images of the autoencoder. Interestingly,
from Figure 5 we notice that the decoder is fooled to
reconstruct an image that seems to belong to the same
incorrect class provided the classifier. For example in the
first row the true class is 0, the mistaken class is 6 and the
decoder produces an image similar to a 6. This suggests
that a similar model may be used for other vision tasks
such as conditional image generation and style transfer.
We reserve this analysis as a future work.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed an analysis of β-VAC in the
presence of adversarial perturbations. We have shown that
the model does not provide increased robustness to adver-
sarial examples however it is able to detect them effec-
tively thanks to the reconstruction error of the decoder
network. Sparse regularization of the classifier does not
help in reducing the effects of adversarial perturbations on
the classification. We have shown that the decoder, when
fed with an adversarial example, tend to reconstruct an
image that belongs to the class mistakenly selected by the
classifier. As a future work, we want to investigate deeper
this aspect that may be exploited to perform conditional
image generation and style transfer tasks. We also plan to
extend these results to more complex vision datasets.
(a) Reconstruction error (b) Model accuracy (c) Detection rate
Fig. 3. Results for the FMNIST dataset.
(a) Reconstruction error (b) Model accuracy (c) Detection rate
Fig. 4. Results for the MNIST dataset.
Table 1. l1 regularization effect on the robustness for the MNIST dataset.
 = 0.0  = 0.075  = 0.150  = 0.225  = 0.3
1e-06 0.9395 0.1360 0.0988 0.0918 0.0471
5-07 0.8461 0.0111 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001
1-07 0.8452 0.0498 0.0218 0.0215 0.0254
5e-08 0.8320 0.1194 0.0646 0.0527 0.0377
Table 2. l1 regularization effect on the robustness for the FMNIST dataset.
 = 0.0  = 0.025  = 0.050  = 0.075  = 0.1
1e-03 0.624 0.185 0.083 0.027 0.009
1e-04 0.657 0.081 0.041 0.026 0.020
1e-05 0.722 0.260 0.140 0.089 0.063
1e-06 0.764 0.216 0.084 0.048 0.033
Table 3. `1 regularization effect on the detection accuracy for the MNIST dataset.
`1 strength  = 0.0  = 0.075  = 0.150  = 0.225  = 0.3
1e-06 0.976 0.976 0.988 0.988 0.988
5e-07 0.967 0.976 0.983 0.983 0.983
1e-07 0.968 0.969 0.984 0.984 0.984
5e-08 0.945 0.953 0.972 0.972 0.972
REFERENCES
Belkin, M., Ma, S., and Mandal, S. (2018a). To understand
deep learning we need to understand kernel learning.
arXiv:1802.01396.
Belkin, M., Rakhlin, A., and Tsybakov, A.B. (2018b).
Does data interpolation contradict statistical optimal-
ity? arXiv:1806.09471.
Bishop, C.M. (2006). Pattern recognition and machine
learning. springer.
Botev, Z.I., Grotowski, J.F., Kroese, D.P., et al. (2010).
Kernel density estimation via diffusion. The annals of
Statistics, 38(5), 2916–2957.
Burgess, C.P., Higgins, I., Pal, A., Matthey, L., Watters,
N., Desjardins, G., and Lerchner, A. (2018). Under-
standing disentangling in β-vae. arXiv:1804.03599.
Feinman, R., Curtin, R.R., Shintre, S., and Gardner, A.B.
(2017). Detecting adversarial samples from artifacts.
arXiv:1703.00410.
Table 4. `1 regularization effect on the detection accuracy for the FMNIST dataset.
`1 strength  = 0.0  = 0.025  = 0.050  = 0.075  = 0.1
1e-03 0.628 0.637 0.741 0.782 0.800
1e-04 0.738 0.716 0.812 0.843 0.852
1e-05 0.699 0.686 0.810 0.838 0.841
1e-06 0.713 0.720 0.830 0.846 0.850
Fig. 5. Example of the effect of adversarial perturbations
on the decoder network. It is noticeable how the
reconstruction belongs to the class mistakenly chosen
by the classifier.
Finlay, C., Calder, J., Abbasi, B., and Oberman, A. (2018).
Lipschitz regularized deep neural networks generalize
and are adversarially robust. arXiv:1808.09540.
Gal, Y. and Ghahramani, Z. (2016). Dropout as a bayesian
approximation: Representing model uncertainty in deep
learning. In ICLR, 1050–1059.
Gong, Z., Wang, W., and Ku, W.S. (2017). Adversarial
and clean data are not twins. arXiv:1704.04960.
Goodfellow, I.J., Shlens, J., and Szegedy, C. (2014).
Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples.
arXiv:1412.6572.
Gretton, A., Borgwardt, K.M., Rasch, M.J., Scho¨lkopf, B.,
and Smola, A. (2012). A kernel two-sample test. Journal
of Machine Learning Research, 13(Mar), 723–773.
Grosse, K., Manoharan, P., Papernot, N., Backes, M., and
McDaniel, P. (2017). On the (statistical) detection of
adversarial examples. arXiv:1702.06280.
Higgins, I., Matthey, L., Pal, A., Burgess, C., Glorot,
X., Botvinick, M., Mohamed, S., and Lerchner, A.
(2017). beta-vae: Learning basic visual concepts with
a constrained variational framework. ICLR, 2(5), 6.
Kingma, D.P. and Welling, M. (2013). Auto-encoding
variational bayes. arXiv:1312.6114.
Li, Y., Bradshaw, J., and Sharma, Y. (2018). Are gen-
erative classifiers more robust to adversarial attacks?
arXiv:1802.06552.
Liu, Y., Chen, X., Liu, C., and Song, D. (2016). Delving
into transferable adversarial examples and black-box
attacks. arXiv:1611.02770.
Madry, A., Makelov, A., Schmidt, L., Tsipras, D., and
Vladu, A. (2017). Towards deep learning models re-
sistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv:1706.06083.
Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.M., Fawzi, A., Uesato, J., and
Frossard, P. (2019). Robustness via curvature regular-
ization, and vice versa. In Proceedings of the IEEE Con-
ference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
9078–9086.
Nair, V. and Hinton, G.E. (2010). Rectified linear units
improve restricted boltzmann machines. In Proceedings
of the 27th international conference on machine learning
(ICML-10), 807–814.
Ross, A.S. and Doshi-Velez, F. (2018). Improving the
adversarial robustness and interpretability of deep neu-
ral networks by regularizing their input gradients. In
Thirty-second AAAI conf. on artificial intelligence.
Shaham, U., Yamada, Y., and Negahban, S. (2018). Un-
derstanding adversarial training: Increasing local stabil-
ity of supervised models through robust optimization.
Neurocomputing, 307, 195–204.
Springenberg, J.T., Dosovitskiy, A., Brox, T., and Ried-
miller, M. (2014). Striving for simplicity: The all con-
volutional net. arXiv:1412.6806.
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan,
D., Goodfellow, I., and Fergus, R. (2013). Intriguing
properties of neural networks. arXiv:1312.6199.
Terzi, M., Susto, G.A., and Chaudhari, P. (2020). Direc-
tional adversarial training for cost sensitive deep learn-
ing classification applications. Engineering Applications
of Artificial Intelligence, 91, 103550.
Tsipras, D., Santurkar, S., Engstrom, L., Turner, A., and
Madry, A. (2018). Robustness may be at odds with
accuracy. arXiv:1805.12152.
